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Abstract—Cognitive radio enables secondary users (SUs) to
explore and exploit the underutilized licensed channels (or
white spaces) owned by the primary users. To improve the
network scalability, the SUs are organized into clusters. This
article proposes a novel artificial intelligence based trust model
approach that uses reinforcement learning (RL) to improve
traditional budget-based cluster size adjustment schemes. The
RL-based trust model enables the clusterhead to observe and
learn about the behaviors of its SU member nodes, and revoke the
membership of malicious SUs in order to ameliorate the effects of
intelligent and collaborative attacks, while adjusting the cluster
size dynamically according to the availability of white spaces.
The malicious SUs launch attacks on clusterheads causing the
cluster size to become inappropriately sized while learning to
remain undetected. In any attack and defense scenario, both the
attackers and the clusterhead adopt RL approaches. Simulation
results have shown that the single-agent RL (SARL) attackers
have caused the cluster size to reduce significantly; while the
SARL clusterhead has slightly helped increase its cluster size, and
this motivates a rule-based approach to efficiently counterattack.
Multi-agent RL attacks have shown to be less effective in an
operating environment that is dynamic.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio ad hoc networks, clustering
methods, trust management, artificial intelligence, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
COGNITIVE radio (CR) networks consist of unlicensedusers (or secondary users, SUs) that explore and use
underutilized licensed channels (or white spaces) owned by
licensed users (or primary users, PUs) in an opportunistic
manner [1]. In a CR network (CRN), where the availability
of white spaces is unpredictable and the amount of resources
are limited, the need to utilize them in an efficient manner
is desirable, and one of the ways to improve such efficiency
is through clustering. Clustering organizes SUs into logical
groups; a SU acts as a leader (or clusterhead) that serves as
a local point of process for essential CR operations, such as
channel sensing and routing, or a member node that associates
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itself with the clusterhead. Leveraging on clustering reduces
the signaling overhead in the network, improves routing effi-
ciency by having minimum nodes in the backbone network,
reduces update on routing information cost, and eliminates the
need to update the PUs’ activities network wide [2], [3]. With
these significant overhead reductions, the white spaces can be
used to enhance network scalability [4], which implies efficient
resource utilization [5], [6]. A network is considered scalable
when the number of member nodes in a cluster increases or
the number of clusters in the network decreases.
A. Attacker and Clusterhead
In our article, there are two main entities of interest: the
potential attackers (SUs) and the clusterhead. We consider all
SUs as potential attackers and there is no specific criteria
or a threshold to differentiate an attacker from a legitimate
(or regular) SU. The following sub-sections provide a general
overview of their roles in CRNs.
1) Attacker’s Role: In our attack scenario, the attackers
have their own attack capability, which is measured in terms
of attack probability 0.1 ≤ P it ≤ 0.9 and attack intensity
0.1 ≤ Iit ≤ 1. Note that P it = 1 is not considered in order to
provide some irregularity or randomness in the attacks. The
main objective of the attackers is to waste the granted/acquired
resources, thereby compromising the network scalability. This
kind of attack has its advantage over the traditional attacks,
such as random and deterministic attacks [7], as it requires
the malicious SUs to learn from the operating environment
and take an appropriate action based on their observations.
2) Clusterhead’s Role: In our counterattack scenario, the
clusterhead adopts a trust model to establish trust amongst its
member nodes. The trust model is incorporated into the cluster
size adjustment scheme, which is embedded in the clusterhead.
The main objective of the clusterhead is to learn the nodes’
behavior and select the legitimate nodes as member nodes in
order to maximize its resource utilization.
In our article, the attacker’s model is formulated using rein-
forcement learning (RL) [8]. RL is an unsupervised artificial
intelligence approach that enables a decision maker (or an
agent) to observe its operating environment represented by
state, and to measure the positive or negative effects of its
action at that state represented by delayed reward; this enables
the agent to learn, and subsequently select a proper action to
be carried out. Using RL, a SU can gain experience and learn
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about the best possible action for a particular state in order
to maximize accumulated rewards as time goes by. Hence, an
attacker that launches an intelligent attack has the capacity to
learn the effects of its attacks on the clusterhead (the reduction
of the cluster size) while avoid being detected. For instance,
when an attacker does not receive the requested amount of
resources (i.e., clusterhead either grants partial amount or
no resources at all), it observes the clusterhead’s perceived
trust (i.e., state) on its earlier action (i.e., attack probability
P it and attack intensity I
i
t ). In our work, we investigate two
main types of intelligent attacks, namely an independent attack
known as single-agent reinforcement learning (SARL) attack,
and a collaborative attack known as multi-agent reinforcement
learning (MARL) attack, which involves message (or payoff)
exchange amongst a group of attackers.
The trust model for the cluster size adjustment scheme
is also formulated and solved using RL. The trust model is
defined in the form of Q-values to keep track of member
nodes’ malicious behavior, which may change as time goes
by. Using the Q-values, the clusterhead selects the legitimate
nodes represented by action and include them in the cluster.
For instance, when the clusterhead observes that its selected
member node (i.e., action) utilizes the granted resources, its
trust value increases. The effect of the clusterhead’s action
(i.e., delayed reward) is an increase in the cluster size.
B. Related Work
While the existing work or approaches have provided some
scalability in clustering, investigation into the effects of intelli-
gent attacks, namely RL attacks on clusterhead, and RL-based
trust countermeasures is lacking. In [9], [10], given a budget
value (i.e., the white spaces amount), a cluster size adjustment
scheme allows a clusterhead to distribute the budget value
to its neighboring nodes in the form of tokens. Since a
neighboring node must receive a token to join a cluster and
become its member node, the clusterhead is able to manage
its cluster size to its intended upper bound cluster size, which
implies cluster scalability.
In [11], attackers launch PU emulation (PUE) attacks on
cooperative spectrum sensing in CRNs so that a clusterhead
makes wrong cluster-level decisions about the presence of
PUs’ activities, and so the clusterhead adopts a reputation-
based hierarchically cooperative spectrum sensing scheme to
improve detection performance and to maintain a compara-
tively low communication overhead. In [12], attackers launch
jamming attacks on the control channel of multi-channel
ad hoc networks, and so the nodes in the clusters adopt
a randomized and distributed scheme based on frequency
hopping to establish a new control channel. In [13], a resource
allocation scheme is used to provide energy efficiency by
selecting legitimate SUs in CRNs in the presence of PUE
attacks.
In [14]–[19], trust models have been applied to channel
sensing and channel access in CRNs to detect malicious nodes
in order to improve sensing outcomes with reduce missed
detection and false alarm rates. In [20], a reputation scheme
has been applied to a clusterhead to detect its malicious
member nodes in order to provide higher security to the
non-manipulability and the agreement property of clusterhead
election results, and consequently it maintains the network
performance with the increase of member nodes. In [21], a
comprehensive survey has been done on various trust models
in CRNs to ameliorate the effects of malicious SUs launching
collaborative attacks.
C. Motivation and Significance
In our article, cluster size adjustment is investigated in the
context of CR to provide network scalability. Larger cluster
size (or smaller number of clusters in a CRN) has been shown
to improve network scalability by reducing routing overheads
[22], while smaller cluster size has been shown to increase
the number of common channels in a cluster [23]. Hence,
both too small or too large a cluster are unfavorable — a
small cluster indicates resource underutilization while a big
cluster indicates resource deprivation of the member nodes.
By using the budget value, the cluster size can be prevented
from getting too small or large. Therefore, to improve network
scalability, a clusterhead ensures that the tokens distributed
to its neighboring nodes are as close to the available budget
value as possible. The tokens serve as a representation of the
rightful or legitimate users to resource utilization. A token may
represent a unit or several unit of resources. Most importantly,
the tokens are given to the legitimate neighboring nodes so that
the white spaces are well utilized, otherwise the tokens will
be wasted. We consider a member node as legitimate when
it has been given transmission opportunities and is entrusted
with additional resources by the clusterhead, and a member
node as malicious when it is not given any resources at that
time of instance.
Due to the dynamicity of channel availability in CRNs, the
member nodes must obey the clusterhead the clusterhead in
order to utilize the white spaces efficiently. The requirement
to fully utilize the granted tokens by its member nodes, has
brought about security challenges in clustering. This is because
the member nodes may become malicious over time and may
launch attacks in an intelligent manner. As the clusterhead
plays a critical role in clustering, it is vital for the clusterhead
to counter intelligent attacks in order to ensure that the
white spaces are appropriately utilized. While the attackers
launch intelligent attacks to create a more detrimental effect
to the clusterhead, the clusterhead also counters the attack by
leveraging on RL-based trust model for cluster size adjustment
to provide cluster scalability. In [24], an in-depth study was
done on cluster size adjustment in the absence of attackers.
While some research has been done on cluster size adjustment
to improve network scalability, to the best of our knowledge,
the study on the effects of intelligent attacks, which are
detrimental to network scalability and to the clusterhead has
not been carried out; and this is the primary motivation for
our article.
The significance of our work is summarized as follows:
• Intelligent attacks with varying probability and intensity
of attack are considered to avoid being detected by the
clusterhead.
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• Intelligent countermeasure, which is a combination of
rules and learning, is adopted to learn the attackers’
actions and so remove them from the cluster.
D. Our Contributions
The novel contributions of our article are as follows:
(a) To propose a SARL-based trust model for cluster size
adjustment scheme to be applied to counter intelligent
and collaborative attacks. The scheme helps the cluster
to grow to its appropriate size (i.e., the size given by
the budget value) in order to maximize the utilization of
white spaces, hence achieving network scalability. The
SARL-based trust model is embedded in a clusterhead
to keep track of the trust value of each member node,
which is then used for token distribution: member nodes
with the highest trust value will be granted the full
amount of tokens, while member node with the lowest
trust value may not be granted the full amount of tokens
or any at all, if the amount of budget is limited (i.e., the
amount of white spaces is insufficient). To the best of
our knowledge, this kind of trust model has not been
applied to clustering in CRNs, particularly for cluster
size adjustment scheme to detect malicious SUs in order
to increase the utilization of white spaces leading to
increased cluster scalability.
(b) To propose conditions for legitimate clusterhead to im-
prove the performance of the SARL-based trust model
where RL algorithms with different capabilities are ap-
plied to malicious SUs. These conditions are categorized
into three cases for performance analysis as follows:
• Case I: Both legitimate clusterhead and malicious SUs
adopt the SARL approach.
• Case II: The legitimate clusterhead uses a RL approach
with greater capability compared to malicious SUs
particularly, i.e., the legitimate clusterhead uses rule-
based SARL, which only allows SUs to join the cluster
when they have met or exceeded certain Q-value, and
malicious SUs use SARL approach.
• Case III: Malicious SUs use a RL algorithm with
greater capability compared to legitimate clusterhead
particularly, i.e., malicious SUs use MARL, and legit-
imate clusterhead uses SARL.
E. Organization of this Article
Section II presents CRN, PU and attack models, white space
computation, and cluster size adjustment. Section III presents
problem formulation for both the attacker and the clusterhead.
Section IV presents the generic SARL and MARL algorithms.
Section V presents the RL-based attack model and trust model
for cluster size adjustment. Section VI discusses the simu-
lation overview, analyses the random and RL-based attacks,
and presents performance evaluation, results and discussion.
Section VII presents the main conclusions of our work and
provides a list of future work for consideration.
TABLE I: General notations
Notation Description
t ∈ T A decision epoch (also called a time window)
with T = {1, 2, . . . }.
ts ∈ Ts A time slot with Ts = {1, 2, . . . , |Ts|}.
m ∈M A PU with M = {1, 2, . . . , |M |}. PU m occu-
pies licensed channel m.
i ∈ I A SU with I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|}.
j ∈ Ji A neighboring node set of SU i.
F i ⊆M A channel set of SU i.
rm The transmission range for PU m.
wim,ts A unit of white space for channel m available to
SU i at a time slot ts.
wit Total amount of white spaces available to SU i
at decision epoch t.
Λm,ts Availability of channel m at decision epoch t.
Λm,ts = 1 means PU is idle or OFF at time slot
ts, and Λm,ts = 0 means PU is busy or ON at
time slot ts.
Λim,ts Equivalent of Λm,ts for SU i.Pm,ts Transition probability matrix of PU activity in




= Prob{Λm,ts = 0|Λm,ts−1 = 1} is
the probability of channel m switches from state




= Prob{Λm,ts = 1|Λm,ts−1 = 0} is
the probability of channel m switches from state
ON at time slot ts − 1 to OFF at time slot t.
Dit Performance indicator of SU i at decision epoch
t.
P it Probability of attack launched by SU i at decision
epoch t.
Iit Intensity of attack launched by SU i at decision
epoch t.
Pc Probability of attack in cluster c.
Ic Intensity of attack in cluster c.
TABLE II: Clustering notations
Notation Description
c ∈ C A cluster with C = {1, 2, . . . }.
T Units of available budget in the form of tokens.
βavailc,t The available budget for cluster c at decision
epoch t.
βrequesti,t Requested tokens from member node i at deci-
sion epoch t.
βgrantedi,t Granted tokens to member node i at decision
epoch t.
βunusedc,t The unused budget for cluster c at decision
epoch t. A budget is considered unused when
the member node does not utilize the budget.
βusedc,t The used budget for cluster c at decision epoch
t.
CHc The clusterhead of cluster c.
Zc,t Cluster size of cluster c at decision epoch t.
Rc,t Cluster size ratio of cluster c at decision epoch
t.
MN i,h A member node i at h hops from its clusterhead.
h The number of hops away from a clusterhead
with h = {1, 2, . . . }.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In our system model, we assume that: a) the clusterhead is
a legitimate entity and it aims to grant tokens to the legitimate
SUs at each decision epoch t and in return the legitimate SUs
are expected to fully utilize the given tokens so as to maximize
the network resource utilization, and b) malicious SUs launch
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TABLE III: RL notations
Notation Description
sit ∈ S State of SU i at decision epoch t.
ait ∈ A Action of SU i at decision epoch t.
rit+1(s
i
t+1) Delayed reward of SU i under state s
i
t+1 at





t) Q-value of SU i under state s
i




α Learning rate with 0 < α < 1.
γ Discount factor with 0 < γ < 1.
ηi,j Weight of information exchanged between SUs i
and j.
attacks without interfering the PUs. This section is organized
as follows. Section II-A presents the cognitive radio network
and primary user models. Section II-B presents the white space
computation. Section II-C presents the cluster size adjustment
scheme. Section II-D presents the attack model.
A. Cognitive Radio Network and Primary User Models
We consider a time-slotted system with a decision epoch
being t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . }. Each decision epoch t consists
of time slot ts ∈ Ts = {1, 2, . . . , |Ts|} with |Ts| being the
number of time slots in a decision epoch. Generally speaking,
the availability of white spaces depends on the amount of time
slots ts in each decision epoch t. The greater the amount of
time slots ts, the higher the amount of available transmission
resources. A node that needs more than one decision epoch
t can be seen as requiring more transmission resources. The
decision epoch repeats, and so a node can transmit more in
different decision epochs. In our work, we have made decision
epoch t configurable in order to cater for various transmission
needs, and this does not affect the system model and our
simulation work. Nodes I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|} are independently
and randomly distributed. Upon joining a cluster, a node i
becomes a h-hop member node MN i,h ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|}
in a cluster c and it transmits data packets to its clusterhead
CHc in the allotted white spaces, which is a transmission
opportunity that allows the node to transmit.
Each PU m ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . , |M |} occupies a licensed
channel m, and it has a particular transmission range rm.
The activity of PU m is represented by a two-state ON-OFF





where pd→bm,ts = Prob{Λm,ts =
0|Λm,ts−1 = 1} indicates the probability of PU m switches
from OFF (idle) state at time slot ts − 1 to ON (busy) state
at time slot ts, and pb→dm,ts = Prob{Λm,ts = 1|Λm,ts−1 = 0}
indicates the probability of PU m switches from ON (busy)
state at time slot ts−1 to OFF (idle) state at time slot ts [25].
Each SU i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|} has a different set of
available channels F i ⊆ M . The availability of channel m
at SU i can be affected if it is physically located within the
transmission range rm of PU m. Let Λim,ts = 1 indicates
that channel m of SU i is absent of PUs’ activity or idle (or
the OFF state) at time slot ts. Given the transition probability
matrix of PU m, SU i, which is physically located within
a PU’s transmission range rm in the absence of PU (i.e.,
Λim,ts = 1), can opportunistically utilize white space w
i
m,ts
from channel m at time slot ts. When SU i is physically
located out of a PU’s transmission range rm, channel m is
available at all times to SU i. We define the availability of
channel m for SU i at timeslot ts as follows:
wim,ts =
{
1, if Λim,ts = 1
0, otherwise
(1)
B. White Space Computation - the Budget Value
A clusterhead CHc manages cluster c at decision epoch t
has a budget βavailc,t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |Ts|}. The budget βavailc,t of
cluster c represents the total amount of white spaces available
for cluster c at decision epoch t. The budget changes with the
amount of white spaces available to both clusterhead and each







s.t. Λim,ts = 1
The total amount of white spaces wit for SU i at decision
epoch t is the summation of all the available white spaces
from time slots 1 to |Ts|. Hence, the total availability of white
spaces for SU i at each time slot ts over all the channels in a







As an illustrative example for white space computation,
please refer to Fig. 1 (a clustered network) and Fig. 2 (white
spaces). In Fig. 1, a cluster is formed in a CRN based on
the number of available common channel(s) in the cluster. In
our work, as the main objective of the cluster size adjustment
scheme is to maximize the use of available resources in CRNs,
it is vital to choose a node with the highest number of available
common channels as the clusterhead in order to maximize the
allocation of the resources to its member nodes. To facilitate a
successful transmission, at least a single common channel must
be available among the nodes in a cluster so that a clusterhead
can broadcast information to its member nodes. We assume
that SUs are randomly distributed, with M = {1, 2, 3, 4}
channels, and each PU transmits in a single channel m with
transmission range rm, so a SU is either located within or
outside a PU’s transmission range. Cluster C1 consists of
clusterhead CH1 as well as member nodes SU1 and SU2.
Cluster C1 has two available common channels m = {3, 4},
where channel 3 is available due to the lack of PU’s activities
from PUBS3, while channel 4 is available at all times as the
SU1 and SU2 are located out of the transmission range r4 of
channel 4 used PUBS4. Note that channel 1 is unavailable
due to the presence of PU’s activities from PUBS1 as SU1
is located within its transmission range r1, and channel 2
is unavailable due to the presence of PU’s activities from
PUBS2 as CH1 and SU2 are located within its transmission
range r2.
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Fig. 2 shows a clusterhead and its member nodes in CRN
operating environment with |Ts| = 4 time slots and |M | = 4
channels. From Fig. 1, each member node has at least one
channel that is always available. Using (2), at the node level,
SU1 at decision epochs t = 1 and t = 2 has a total amount
of white spaces w11 = 3 and w
1
2 = 4, respectively. Using (3),
at the cluster level, cluster C1 at decision epochs t = 1 and
t = 2 has budget βavailc,1 = 2 and β
avail
c,2 = 4, respectively. The
white spaces at decision epoch t = 1 are relatively less due to
the unavailability of the channels at time slot ts = 2 for SU1,
SU2 and CH1, and at time slot ts = 3 for SU1.
In summary, the presence of PUs’ activity (Λm,ts+1 = 0)
reduces the budget value, βavailc,t forcing clusterhead CHc to
experience a smaller cluster size as it has lesser white spaces
to distribute to its member node(s) MN i,h. Conversely, the
absence of PUs’ activity (Λm,ts+1 = 1) increases the budget
βavailc,t , thus enabling clusterhead CHc to have a bigger cluster
size since it has more white spaces to distribute to its member
node(s) MN i,h. The cluster size of cluster c at decision epoch
t, Zc,t is the summation of all the member nodes of various







C. Cluster Size Adjustment Scheme
In our cluster size adjustment scheme, we consider a
clusterhead CHc in cluster c at decision epoch t has budget
βavailc,t , which is the total amount of transmission opportunities
in a CRN. A clusterhead CHc distributes its budget βavailc,t
in the form of tokens T (i.e., white spaces), to its member
nodes MN i,h. Each member node with token(s) is given the
opportunity to transmit its data packets. Clusterhead CHc
considers a token is utilized once it has granted it to its member
node for data packets transmission purposes. Note that the
further a node is away from its clusterhead, the higher the
number of tokens are needed for data packet transmission. For
instance, a one-hop member node MN i,1 needs only one T
to transmit its data packet, while member node MN i,h needs
h T to perform the same task. We assume that a member node
MN i,h only knows its one-hop upstream (or parent) node. For
a node to join the cluster as a member, the parent member node
MN i,h, which is h-hop away from the clusterhead, needs an
additional h+1 T from CHc in order for its downstream node
to transmit its data packets successfully. We denote member
node MN i,h successful data packet transmission as βusedi,t .
As an illustrative example for budget βavailc,t allocation as
shown in Fig. 3, we re-consider Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. At decision
epoch t = 2, in cluster C1, clusterhead CH1 has a budget
value βavailc,2 = 4. At the start of decision epoch t = 2,
SU1 and SU2 request to join cluster c and so they request
1 and 3 T (i.e., βrequest1,2 = 1 and βrequest2,2 = 3), respectively.
As mentioned earlier, a one-hop node requires one T for data
transmission. However, note that SU2 requests an additional
two T s as it intends to add SU3, which is its downstream two-
hop node. Suppose SU1 is a legitimate member node but not
SU2, and clusterhead CH1 not having prior knowledge of their
















Fig. 1: A scenario of a clustered network with four PU base
stations — PUBS1 – PUBS4 own channels 1 – 4, respec-
tively. A cluster has a clusterhead CH1, and two member
nodes SU1 and SU2; they have common channels 3 and 4
— channel 3 is underutilized and channel 4 is out of the





































Fig. 2: A sample of white spaces at SUs, clusterhead CH1,
and cluster C1.
2332-7731 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCCN.2018.2881135, IEEE
Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking



























Fig. 3: A budget scenario for clusterhead CH1 in cluster C1
at decision epoch t = 2.
and βgranted2,2 = 3), respectively. After data transmission (i.e.,
at the end of decision epoch t = 2), SARL clusterhead CH1
is able to observe the amount of T used by its member nodes.
In our example, given that SU2 is malicious, the amount of
token wasted is βused2,2 = 0 since it does not utilize the given
token to help clusterhead CH1 to add a downstream node as
well as to join itself as a one-hop member node. Hence, from
the clusterhead CH1 perspective, the total amount of budget
used is βusedc,2 = 1.
D. Attack Model
In our attack model, malicious SU i aims to minimize the
token utilization (or βusedc,t ) without being detected by the
clusterhead, and has its own perceived performance indicator
Dit denoting how well it has performed in the attack after each
decision epoch t. The performance indicator value, Dit is the
perceived clusterhead trust value of the malicious SU i, and





A malicious SU’s behavior is defined by the attack prob-
ability and intensity. Its possible actions are denoted as ait
= (P it , I
i
t ) ∈ A, where 0.1 ≤ P it ≤ 0.9 is the attack
probability and 0.1 ≤ Iit ≤ 1 is the attack intensity. The
attack probability and intensity represent the attack frequency
and strength, respectively. The attack probability P it = 1 is not
considered in our scenarios so as to provide some randomness
in the attack. Note that the effects of the malicious SU’s attack
to cluster size vary as time goes by since the SU is capable of
attacking with various possible actions to avoid being detected.
An attack causes the tokens granted βgrantedi,t to a malicious
SU to become underutilized and its action not being detected
by the clusterhead. However, when a clusterhead detects an
attack, the malicious SU may be punished with a reduced
trust value, and risks being removed from its cluster. The
knowledge of its previous attack, particularly the effects of
attack on cluster scalability is used as a decision making factor
for the next attack.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
When a clusterhead CHc has a certain budget βavailc,t based
on the availability of white spaces at decision epoch t, it
attempts to distribute the budget in the form of tokens T to its
member nodes so as to maximize the budget utilization, lead-
ing to larger cluster size and hence higher cluster scalability.
However, due to the hostile environment in CRNs, a member
node MN i,h may request more tokens from clusterhead CHc
with the intention of admitting new nodes to cluster c but un-
derutilizes them. Hence, at the node level, the token utilization
of a member node MN i,h is the amount of white spaces used,
and it can be measured by data packet transmission activities.
The unused amount of the budget for member node MN i,h,
namely βunusedi,t can be denoted as follows:
βunusedi,t = β
granted
i,t − βusedi,t (6)
As clusterhead CHc’s objective is to maximise the cluster’s
budget utilization, it aims to minimize βunusedc,t for the cluster.
The unused budget βunusedc,t is the summation of all the











s.t. βavailc,t > 0
On the contrary, the malicious SU i’s objective is to
minimize or underutilize the given tokens T . In other words,




i,t − βusedi,t ) (8)
s.t. βavailc,t > 0
IV. RL ALGORITHMS
In the SARL approach, which is the single-agent approach,
each individual decision maker (or agent) learns from the
operating environment independently; while in the MARL
approach, which is the multi-agent approach, each agent
learns from the operating environment and collaborates with
its neighboring agents via exchanging local payoffs among
themselves, so that it can evaluate and coordinate its action
as part of the joint action, which is the action selected by
neighboring agents. In our work, SARL is embedded in both
clusterheads and malicious SUs while MARL is embedded
in the malicious SUs only. The SARL algorithm maximizes
the local Q-value; while the MARL algorithm maximizes the
global Q-value (or the sum of the local Q-values of all agents).
A. SARL Algorithm
The SARL algorithm embedded in each agent i is shown
in Algorithm 1. An agent i observes state sit ∈ S, which is
the local decision making factors from the dynamic operating
environment and selects an action ait ∈ A at decision epoch
t. Either an exploitation or an exploration action is selected.
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ALGORITHM 1: SARL
1: procedure
2: Observe current state sit
3: if exploration then
4: Select a random action ait
5: else
6: Select an optimal action ai,∗t using Eq. (9)
7: end if
8: Receive delayed reward rit+1(sit+1, ait+1)
9: Update Q-value Qit+1(sit, ait) using Eq. (10)
10: end procedure
The exploitation action is a greedy action with the maximum







The exploration action is a random action selected to update
the Q-values of non-greedy actions so that better actions may





t+1), which represents the positive or negative
effect from its local operating environment at the next decision
epoch t+1 [8]. As the decision epoch progresses t = 1, 2, . . . ,
an agent i explores all state-action pairs (sit, a
i
t) and updates



















where 0 < α < 1 represents the learning rate, and 0 < γ < 1
represents the discount factor.
The SARL algorithm embedded in each agent i may also
be stateless; the state sit representation can be omitted while
still achieving its goal i.e., the delayed reward rit+1 does not
depend on the state but action only. In a stateless model an
agent i’s state never changes throughout its operation and it










where 0 < α < 1 represents the learning rate, and 0 < γ < 1
represents the discount factor.
B. MARL Algorithm
The MARL algorithm as shown in Algorithm 2, extends the
SARL algorithm with local payoff exchange, is embedded in
each agent i. In a multi-agent setting, multiple agents exchange
future rewards among themselves at decision epoch t, and
update their Q-values simultaneously at decision epoch t+ 1.






j) , which are locally maximized, from
its neighboring agent j ∈ J i, where J i is a set of agent i’s
neighbors. Towards the end of decision epoch t, the agent i
ALGORITHM 2: MARL
1: procedure
2: Observe current state sit
3: if exploration then
4: Select a random action ait
5: else
6: Select an optimal action ai,∗t using Eq. (9)
7: end if
8: Receive shared information from neighboring agent
j ∈ J i
9: Receive delayed reward rit+1(sit+1)
Calculate combined information from neighboring
agents and itself
10: Update Q-value Qit+1(sit, ait) using Eq. (12)
11: end procedure
Fig. 4: An abstract model for agent i at (a) decision epoch t,
and (b) decision epoch t+ 1












a future reward based on state sjt , and it is received from
neighboring agents J i at decision epoch t. In Fig. 4(b), at
decision epoch t + 1, the agent i receives delayed reward
rit+1(s
i
t+1) and learns the best possible action for a particular
state sjt , which is part of the joint action, using Equation
(12) in order to achieve an optimal global reward at decision
epoch t + 1. This allows an agent to evaluate its own action
while taking into account the average future rewards of its
neighboring agents, where the future reward of each neighbor
j is weighted by ηi,j = 1/|J i|. Equation (12) has been applied

















Generally speaking, there are four main differences be-
tween MARL and another learning mechanism, namely non-
cooperative game (e.g., prisoners’ dilemma), where decision
makers select actions independently. Firstly, MARL enables
decision makers to select actions based on their own, and
their respective neighbors, actions and payoffs in order to
achieve optimal joint action, contributing to optimal network-
wide performance [29], while non-cooperative game enables
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decision makers to select actions based on their own action
and payoff only in order to improve local network performance
[30]. Secondly, MARL requires local information to compute
optimal joint action, while non-cooperative game requires a
complete set of global information to compute Nash equilib-
rium that provides the optimal local action [31], [32]. Thirdly,
MARL learns as time goes by to maximize long-term rewards,
while non-cooperative game computes Nash equilibrium for
each episode (or time window). Fourthly, MARL allows the
agents’ behavior to change as time goes by in a dynamic
operating environment, while non-cooperative game assumes
each decision maker to react rationally.
V. RL-BASED ATTACK MODEL AND TRUST MODEL FOR
CLUSTER SIZE ADJUSTMENT
This section discusses the two separate RL-based models for
both the attacker and the clusterhead. In the RL-based attack
models for the attackers the state sit represents the performance
indicator Dit as seen in (13) and its action a
i
t is the combination
of two sub-actions, namely the probability of attack P it and
the intensity of attack Iit . In the RL-based trust model for
the clusterhead, it does not have a state (i.e., at each decision
epoch, its state never changes) and yet it can still achieve its
goal by relying on the action it takes as seen in (11). We
have summarized the RL components for the attacker and the
clusterhead in Tables IV and V.
A. Attack Model Embedded in Each Malicious SU
In addition to the traditional random and deterministic
attacks, where the latter employs with certain attack proba-
bility and intensity, the malicious SUs can also leverage on
SARL and MARL to launch attacks. In the SARL approach,
each malicious SU i launches attacks independently with the
objective of reducing cluster scalability by not cooperating
with the clusterhead to add new nodes when it has been
granted with the requested amount of tokens T . Specifically,
it maximizes the unused budget βunusedi,t (see 6) and avoids
being removed from the cluster by its clusterhead, which
either increases or reduces its trust value. In this intelligent
attack, the malicious SU i learns the operating environment
by observing its current performance indicator Dit ∈ [0, 1],
which is calculated using (5). The performance indicator Dit
is uniformly partitioned into four sub-ranges as seen in (13),




1 (poor) 0 ≤ Dit < 0.25,
2 (average) 0.25 ≤ Dit < 0.5,
3 (good) 0.5 ≤ Dit < 0.75,
4 (best) 0.75 ≤ Dit ≤ 1.
(13)
We assume that each SU i has its initial performance
indicator value of 0.25. The action ait is the combination of
two sub-actions, namely attack probability, 0 ≤ P it ≤ 0.9
and attack intensity 0 ≤ Iit ≤ 1. The attack intensity is
measured by the amount of tokens used by the malicious
SU. Lower intensity indicates higher white space utilization
TABLE IV: RL model embedded in each attacker
State sit ∈ S = (1, 2, . . . 4) represents the performance indicator
for attacker i at decision epoch t. States sit = 1 and
sit = 4 indicate that the attacker has the worst and the best
performance, respectively
Action ait ∈ A = (P it , Iit) represents the sub-actions of the
probability of attack P it and the intensity of attack I
i
t , where
0.1 ≤ P it ≤ 0.9 and 0.1 ≤ Iit ≤ 1
Reward rit = β
unused
i,t represents the unused white spaces
TABLE V: RL model for cluster size adjustment embedded in
a clusterhead
Action ait ∈ A ={ait
∣∣ max Qit(ait)} where i = {1, 2, . . . , n},
represents set of one-hop member nodes in a cluster —node
with the highest Q-value is chosen, followed by a node with
the second highest Q-value, and so on.
Reward rit = β
used
i,t represents the total amount of used white spaces
by the chosen member nodes at decision epoch t





Iit=0.1) taken by a SU indicates an attack with the lowest
attack probability and intensity, while an action ait of (P
i
t =0.9,
Iit =1) taken by a SU indicates an attack with the highest
probability and intensity.
The delayed reward of a malicious SU i is rit = β
unused
i,t ,
which consists of the unused white spaces. The unused white
spaces are caused by the unutilized resources not used for data
packet transmission and/or the help to the clusterhead to add
member nodes.
The SARL algorithm embedded in each SU i is shown in
Algorithm 1. Note that each SU i is a potential attacker and
it leverages on the SARL model to learn the best combination
of sub-actions given a state so as to avoid being detected and
removed by the clusterhead. After carrying out the attack at
decision epoch t, the malicious SU updates the state-action
pair (sit,a
i
t) in its Q-table using (10)
B. Trust Model Embedded in a Clusterhead for Cluster Size
Adjustment
Through the token allocation process, at each decision epoch
t, clusterhead CHc tracks the behavior of its member nodes
MN i,1 (i.e., one-hop downstream nodes) using Q-value. In the
SARL approach, clusterhead CHc select its legitimate member
nodes by selecting the highest Qit(a
i
t) values. Member node
MN i,1 is considered legitimate when it follows the clustering
rules: a) adds node(s) based on the requested number of
tokens, and b) obeys to drop itself and its downstream node(s)
from the cluster when the requested number of tokens is not
granted.
The clusterhead applies a trust model to learn the behavior
of its member nodes in order to distribute the tokens to them
so as to efficiently maximize its cluster size. Denote ait ∈ A =
{ait
∣∣ max Qit(ait)} where i = {1, 2, . . . , n}, is a set of one-hop
member nodes with the highest Q values in a cluster. Upon
action selection, the delayed reward is rit = β
used
c,t , which is
the used white space after the each chosen node has added new
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ts=|Ts|
CLUSTER FORMATION:  Clusterhead receives request and 
grants tokens to its one-hop member nodes
CLUSTER FORMATION: One-hop member nodes add their 
child(ren) nodes 






LEARNING: Clusterhead learns the behavior of the 
member nodes through token utilization
ts=3
Fig. 5: A flowchart that depicts the various phases of a cluster
size adjustment scheme at decision epoch t that consists of
ts = |Ts| time slots.
nodes and/or transmitted its data packets and/or relay packets
for its downstream nodes. The clusterhead then updates its
member nodes’ Q-values accordingly.
Fig. 5 shows the various phases of a cluster size adjustment
scheme in the form of a flowchart. Each decision epoch t
consists of ts = |Ts| time slots. During the cluster formation,
at time slot ts = 1, the clusterhead gathers information and
forms a cluster based on its neighboring nodes Q-values.
During this phase, the clusterhead grants tokens to its one-hop
member node —a node with the highest Q-value is granted
the most tokens, followed by a node with the second highest
Q-value and so on, and nodes with lower Q-values may be
granted with tokens, subject to the availability of the remaining
tokens. At time slot ts = 2, the one-hop member nodes add
their child(ren) nodes based on the granted tokens. At time
slot ts = 3, data transmission begins and ends at ts = |Ts−1|.
At time slot ts = |Ts|, the clusterhead learns about the
legitimate level of its member nodes – a member node has a
higher legitimate level if it has utilized all the granted tokens
during data transmission. In our scenario, we assume that the
demand for nodes to join a cluster is higher than the available
tokens. Hence, there is no issue of token wastage from the
clusterhead’s perspective. As an illustrative example, during
the cluster formation at decision epoch t, a clusterhead has 10
tokens and has learnt knowledge (i.e., Q-value) of the nodes
in the network. Nodes A, B and C with Q-values of 0.4, 0.3
and 0.3 respectively, are granted at most 4, 3, and 3 T tokens,
respectively. However, if nodes A, B and C requested only 3,
1 and 1 T tokens respectively, the remaining tokens are then
given to other new nodes in the network to avoid wastage.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
There are two main entities of interest in our simulation,
namely SUs (potential attackers) and clusterhead. An intel-
ligent attacker adopts SARL to avoid being detected when
launching independent attacks, while an intelligent clusterhead
adopts SARL to detect attackers, remove them from its cluster,
and grant its budget to legitimate SUs so as to increase the
cluster size.
A. Simulation Overview
1) Summary of Tasks: In our simulation work, we perform
the following tasks. Firstly, we investigate the nature of
the non-SARL attacks, namely random and deterministic, to
discover their similarities or differences (see Section VI-B).
Secondly, based on the results about their characteristics, we
establish four scenarios of attack with non-SARL or SARL
embedded in clusterhead and/or attackers, and use the results
as baselines (see Section VI-C1). Thirdly, we establish a rule-
based SARL for clusterhead to counter SARL attacks and
show its further improvement to the cluster size ratio (see
Section VI-C2). Finally, we investigate the MARL attackers’
performance on a SARL clusterhead, and discuss the effec-
tiveness of MARL attacks in a dynamic operating environment
(see Section VI-C3).
2) Assumptions: We consider at each decision epoch t,
clusterhead CHc in cluster c attempts to distribute its budget
in the form of tokens T to its neighboring nodes in order
to maximize the budget utilization so as to improve network
scalability.
Clusterhead CHc aims to maximize cluster size based on
budget βavailc,t . To implement this scenario, SARL algorithm
is embedded in clusterhead CHc so that, at the end of each
decision epoch t (i.e., after data packet transmission), CHc
learns its member nodes’ behavior through Q-value updates
in order to identify more reliable nodes (i.e., with higher
trust values) as time goes by. We assume that clusterhead
CHc is legitimate at all times and its cluster size at each
decision epoch t is influenced by the given budget based on
the amount of white spaces, and there are always SUs with
certain attack probability P it and intensity I
i
t that want to join
the cluster. Throughout decision epoch T , we also assume that
a cluster c has a maximum average attack probability Pc and
intensity Ic, which are both derived from the initial mean of
the attack probabilities P i0 and intensities I
i
0 of all its attackers,
respectively, and they are shown in (14) and (15). Henceforth,
the attack probability and intensity discussed in our article
refer to the cluster’s attack probability and intensity, namely
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3) Performance Metric: In our work, we measure the attack
performance based on cluster size ratio that compares cluster
sizes before and after an attack at the end of each decision
epoch t as shown in (16). Higher cluster size ratio is desirable
as it indicates greater network scalability. Table VI shows the
simulation parameters. For simplicity, we consider only two




. This is because the number of PUs in CRN does





where Zc,ts=|Ts| is the cluster size measured at the end of a
decision epoch t after an attack has taken place, and Zc,ts=1
is the cluster size measured at the start of a decision epoch
t when the clusterhead has granted its tokens to its member
nodes.
B. Preliminaries: Analysis of non-SARL Attacks - Random and
Deterministic Attacks
In this section, we analyze the effects of non-SARL attacks,
namely random and deterministic attacks on the cluster size
ratio.
We consider a scenario where both SUs and clusterhead do
not adopt SARL, and the attackers attack in cluster c with
an attack probability 0.1 ≤ Pc ≤ 0.9. In a random attack,
an attacker attacks with a random intensity that ranges from
0 ≤ Iit ≤ 0.9, while in a deterministic attack, an attacker
attacks with an attack intensity Iit . Fig. 6 shows that the cluster
size ratio decreases as the attack probability Pc and intensity
Ic increase.
In our simulation, given an attack probability Pc, both
random and deterministic (with intensity Ic = 1) attacks yield
similar cluster size ratio, and their respective 95% confidence
interval shown in Fig. 7, establish that both random and
deterministic (with intensity Ic = 1) attacks are similar in
nature, which have similar maximum and minimum ratios.
Hence, both random and deterministic (with intensity Ic = 1)
attacks are considered to be equivalent. Henceforth, determin-
istic (with intensity Ic = 1) attacks are also referred as random
attacks.
C. Simulation Setup and Analysis
The following three cases, namely Case I, Case II, and Case
III establish the conditions as proposed in Section I-D. In our
work, the main objective of the SARL malicious SUs is to
waste the tokens granted to them and yet remain undetected,
while the SARL clusterhead aims to learn its member nodes
behavior and remove the malicious ones from the cluster. By
wasting the tokens, the malicious SUs reduce the cluster size.
1) Case I: We investigate the effectiveness of using SARL
approach in attacks by considering the following four sce-
narios: in Scenario (a), both attackers and clusterhead adopt
non-SARL approaches; in Scenario (b), attackers adopt non-
SARL approach and the clusterhead adopts the SARL ap-
proach; in Scenario (c) attackers adopt SARL approach and the
clusterhead adopts non-SARL approach, and in Scenario (d),















Fig. 6: Cluster size ratio reduces with increasing attack prob-
ability Pc and intensity Ic. Random and deterministic (Ic = 1)
attacks cause the most detrimental effects to a cluster.
























Fig. 7: Cluster size ratio for non-SARL attack algorithms (with
confidence interval 95%). (a) Random attack (b) Deterministic
attack (Ic = 1). Both attacks have similar maximum and
minimum ratios.
both attackers and clusterhead adopt the SARL approaches.
Scenarios (a) – (c) are used as baselines while Scenario (d)
refers to Case I of our contribution stated in Section I-D. Table
VII provides a summary of these scenarios.
Fig. 8 presents the results of the four attack scenarios.
The four sub-graphs have similar trends with cluster size
ratio decreasing when attack probability Pc and intensity Ic
increase. Figs. 8(a) and (c) show that when the non-SARL
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Fig. 8: Cluster scalability vs. varying attack intensity: Scenario (a), both attackers and clusterhead use non-SARL approaches;
Scenario (b), attackers use non-SARL approach and the clusterhead uses the SARL approach; Scenario (c), attackers use SARL
approach and the clusterhead uses non-SARL approach; Scenario (d), both attackers and clusterhead use the SARL approaches.
Cluster size ratio decreases with increasing attack probability Pc. SARL attackers achieve the lowest cluster size ratio (which
also indicates lower cluster scalability) as seen in Scenario (c) and (d).
clusterhead unequivocally grants tokens to its member nodes,
the SARL malicious member nodes learnt its clusterhead char-
acteristics (Scenario (c)), and increase their attack capabilities,
resulting in a cluster size ratio drop to 37%. Conversely,
Figs. 8(b) and (d) show that when a clusterhead adopts the
SARL approach to detect and remove its malicious nodes
from the cluster, the SARL malicious member nodes learnt
its clusterhead characteristics (Scenario (d)) and adjusted their
attack capabilities to avoid being detected, resulting in a
significant cluster size ratio drop to 44%. We conclude that
SARL attackers cause a more detrimental effect to the cluster
size ratio as compared to non-SARL attackers. In addition,
the results in Figs. 8(a) and (d) show that when both attackers
and clusterhead adopt SARL or non-SARL, the cluster size
ratio reduced significantly to almost 48%, and this necessitates
further work to enhance SARL clusterhead’s learning process
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TABLE VI: Simulation parameters
Notation Description Value
T A decision epoch 10000
|M | Number of primary users 2
P Transition probability matrix





|I| Number of secondary users 50
βavailc,t Available budget ≤ 15
α Learning rate 0.5
γ Discount rate 0.8
TABLE VII: Case I scenarios
Attackers
Clusterhead Non-SARL SARL
Non-SARL Scenario (a) Scenario (b)
SARL Scenario (c) Scenario (d)
Fig. 9: Performance of attackers and clusterhead in various
scenarios — SARL clusterhead generally perform well in
either non-SARL or SARL attacks as seen in Scenarios (b) and
(d). However, cluster size ratio decreases significantly when
attack probability Pc ≥ 0.6, despite the adoption of SARL by
the clusterhead as seen in Scenario (d).
in order to increase its performance in cluster scalability.
For simplicity sake, we focus on attack intensity Ic = 1
in our subsequent simulations since all the four sub-graphs in
Fig. 8 have similar trends – i.e., the cluster size ratio decreases
when attack probability Pc and intensity Ic increase.
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 compare the four attack scenarios
against the cluster size ratio. We find that non-SARL attackers
performed poorly even as their attack probabilities increase
as seen in Scenarios (a) and (b), where the cluster size ratio
still remains at about 0.55 even when the attack probability
Pc = 0.9. This is because the attackers do not have the
capability to observe their operating environment and learn
from their previous attacks in order to launch a better subse-
quent attack. In Fig. 10, from the attackers’ perspective, their
attacks have caused the cluster size ratio to reduce by 37%
and 44% in Scenarios (c) and (d), respectively. Note that even
when the clusterhead adopted SARL to remove its malicious
member nodes, the SARL attackers’ performance improved
significantly as the attack probability Pc increased. This is
because when the attack probability Pc increased, the cluster-
head failed to learn accurately and hence SARL clusterhead
may not be efficient enough in an enviroment saturated with
malicious SUs. As from the clusterhead’s perspective when
SARL is adopted, the cluster size ratio reduces by 4% and
11% in Scenarios (b) and (d), respectively. Note that SARL
clusterhead adopts SARL to remove its malicious member
nodes, the non-SARL attackers’ do not make a significant
impact to the cluster size even when the attack probability
P increases. This is because they do not learn to avoid being
detected by the clusterhead and hence in Scenario (c), the
clusterhead is able to maintain a reasonable cluster size ratio
as attack probability Pc increases.
From our investigation, we conclude that the SARL ap-
proach may not be effective when a cluster has a higher
number of malicious SUs, as seen in Scenarios (b) and (d).
When the environment becomes increasingly unstable, with
Pc ≥ 0.6, the inaccurate learnt knowledge causes the SARL
clusterhead to make wrong decisions. These observations
warrant further investigations in order to provide a SARL
clusterhead a better mechanism to detect malicious SUs of
various probabilities. As for the marginal improvement on the
ability of adopting SARL to detect malicious SUs as seen in
Scenarios (a) compared to (b) and Scenarios (c) compared
to (d), the SARL can be enhanced to take into account the
instability of the operating environment. As such, we have
addressed this issue in Conclusions and Future Work (Section
VII). The following sub-section discusses a rule-based learning
mechanism for the SARL clusterhead.



















Fig. 10: SARL-attackers achieve the lowest cluster size ratio
as seen in Scenario (c) and (d) (indicating poorer scalability).
2) Case II: We further fine-tuned the traditional SARL
approach for the clusterhead by incorporating a rule-based
approach, which is Case II alluded to in Section I-D. This
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Fig. 11: Performance of rule-based SARL algorithm with
various thresholds: cluster size ratio decreases with increasing
attack probability Pc. QV9eRL generally achieves the highest
cluster size ratio when the attack probability Pc ≤ 0.6. Higher
cluster size ratio increases cluster scalability.
approach allows nodes to join the cluster when they have
met or exceeded certain Q-value, and to ensure only nodes of
certain trustworthiness in terms of their Q-value are selected.
For instance, QV1eRL and QV9eRL allow nodes, which have
met or exceeded Q-values of 0.1 and 0.9, respectively to join
the cluster. When this rule-based method is applied to the
nodes, the higher the threshold, the more trustworthy the nodes
will be in a cluster, and this increases cluster scalability. We
tested the rule-based SARL algorithm with varying thresholds
from 0.1 to 0.9 under the same parameter settings used by the
non-SARL and the traditional SARL algorithms. The results
have also shown that the cluster size ratio decreases when the
attack probabilities Pc increase as is seen in Fig. 11. The rule-
based SARL, namely QV9eRL achieves the highest cluster
size ratio since it only allows highly trustworthy nodes to join
the cluster (i.e., Q-values ≥ 0.9).
Fig. 12 shows the ratio improvement of the rule-based
SARL algorithm with varying Q-value threshold. The ratio
improvement is the cluster size ratio difference between rule-
based SARL and traditional SARL approaches. Rule-based
SARL, QV9eRL achieves the best performance as it increases
the cluster size ratio up to 17% when the attack probability
Pc ≤ 0.6. However, its performance drops as the attack prob-
ability Pc increases. While SARL clusterhead learns from its
operating environment to increase cluster scalability, however,
when the environment consists of malicious nodes with higher
attack probability, the learnt knowledge may not be accurate.
3) Case III: We further increased the attackers’ capabil-
ity by adopting the MARL approach to launch attacks on
the SARL clusterhead, as mentioned in our contribution in
Section I-D. The MARL attackers in the cluster shared their
learnt knowledge (i.e., Q-value) amongst themselves in order
Fig. 12: Improvement of using rule-based SARL over
traditional SARL approach. Rule-based SARL algorithms
(QVeRL6 – QVeRL9) perform well when the attack prob-
ability Pc ≤ 0.6. The increase in malicious activities (i.e.,
Pc ≥ 0.7) causes the clusterhead to learn inaccurately
resulting in the decrease in the cluster size ratio.

















Fig. 13: Attacks performance using MARL (collaborative) vs.
SARL (independent): MARL attacks have shown to be less
effective; when compared with SARL attacks, MARL attacks’
effectiveness reduces to 29% as the attack probability Pc
increases since higher Pc increases the instability of the oper-
ating environment and this causes the learnt global knowledge
to be inaccurate leading to a lesser effectiveness of the MARL
attacks.
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Fig. 14: Q-value comparisons for MARL and SARL attacks.
Figs (a) – (e) show the average Q-values of all the nodes in a
cluster with attack probability Pc of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9,
respectively. Similar trends are observed in other probabilities.
The MARL attackers have rather insignificant increase in the
average Q-values: 0.03, 0.03, 0.02, 0.22 and 0.24% for attack
probability Pc equal to 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9, respectively.
to increase the effectiveness of their attacks. Fig. 13 shows the
results of both MARL and SARL attackers launching attacks
on its clusterhead with attack intensity Iit = 1. As the attack
probability Pc increased in a cluster, both MARL and SARL
attackers caused the cluster size ratio to be reduced to 17%
and 29%, respectively.
Due to the MARL’s characteristic of facilitating collabo-
ration among SUs and sharing of learnt knowledge in order
to have collective global knowledge, MARL attackers were
expected to perform better than the SARL attackers [33].
However, our investigation proves otherwise.
In our simulated operating environment, which is dynamic
in nature (i.e., changes in attack probability), the MARL at-
tackers collaborate and share their learnt knowledge. When the
learning process is done in an unstable operating environment,
each attacker with different attack probability P it will learn
based on their own capacity; and as such the learnt knowledge
will not be optimal causing the learnt global knowledge to
be inaccurate [34]. Further analysis in Fig. 14 shows that
the MARL attackers in a cluster generally have higher Q-
values as their attacks are rather conservative as compared to
SARL attackers, and hence they are regarded by the SARL
clusterhead as less malicious. In addition, any increase in
the number of malicious SUs to collaborate in the MARL
operating environment will only cause further inaccuracy to
the global knowledge, and hence the result in Fig. 13. In order
for the attackers to take advantage of the MARL approaches,
two factors are needed in the operating environment, namely
stability and adaptation to the unpredicted behavior of other
attackers [35].
D. Simulation Results and Discussions
Given the analysis in Section VI-C, we make comparisons
amongst the three algorithms, namely non-SARL, traditional
SARL and rule-based SARL (QV9eRL) algorithms. The non-
RL scheme that employs Scenario (a) is used as a baseline,
while both the traditional SARL and rule-based QV9eRL
scheme employ Scenario (b). The results shown in Fig. 15
demonstrate that QV9eRL outperforms the non-SARL and the
traditional SARL algorithms as the attack probability increases
from Pc = 0.2 to Pc = 0.8. While the rule-based approach
enables the SARL clusterhead to maximize its resources, it
does not show any improvement in scenarios where attack
probability Pc = 0.1 and Pc = 0.9. In a scenario where
Pc = 0.1, all the three algorithms perform equally well
since the majority of the SUs are legitimate, and selecting
the SUs randomly or based on learnt knowledge does not
have much effect. From the SARL perspective, the absence
of malicious SUs does not warrant the clusterhead to learn,
hence all the three algorithms provide satisfactory performance
for cluster size adjustment. On the other hand, in a scenario
where attack probability Pc = 0.9, all the algorithms fail to
perform equally well as the majority of the SUs are all highly
malicious in nature. In such a scenario, neither adopting SARL
nor rule-based SARL (QV9eRL) algorithm may help increase
the cluster size ratio as the malicious operating environment
causes the clusterhead to learn inaccurately and hence, yield
the lowest cluster size ratio. While this extreme scenario may
not likely exist in the network, we have further discussed this
scenario in Section VII.
In RL, both SARL and MARL agents require a certain
degree of stability in the operating environment in order to
acquire accurate learnt knowledge. In our work, a stable
environment is seen as having more legitimate (or regular)
SUs than malicious SUs. We consider that a SU, whether
legitimate or malicious, is capable to launch attacks but with
lower attack probability (and / or lower attack intensity). From
the SARL clusterhead’s perspective, when the attack proba-
bility (or attack intensity) increases, it causes the operating
environment to become unstable, and hence it affects the
outcome of the learnt knowledge about its member nodes.
From the attacker’s perspective, when it adopts the SARL
approach, its independent learnt knowledge is more accurate
as compared to adopting the MARL approach that incorporates
shared knowledge from its neighboring nodes.
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Fig. 15: Performance comparison of non-RL, traditional RL
and rule-based RL algorithms — Rule-based RL (QV9eRL)
outperforms non-RL and traditional RL even when the attack
probability Pc ≥ 0.7.
As a summary, when there is a strong presence of malicious
SUs, the clusterhead resources are bound to be wasted by
member nodes, and hence yield lower cluster size ratio.
E. Complexity Analysis
We investigate the computational, message and storage
complexities of SARL and MARL. The complexity analysis is
inspired by [36] and it consists of step-wise, which refers to a
single iteration or execution of the RL algorithm, agent-wise
at the agent level, and network-wide at the network level that
covers all the agents in the network.
Computational complexity defines the number of execution
cycles required to update the Q-values for all state-action pairs
of the agents. Using Algorithm 1, the step-wise complexity is
O(|A|) since an agent i updates its Q-value upon receiving
a delayed reward (Step 9) and each state has |A| actions; the
agent-wise complexity is O(|S||A|), since an agent i updates
its Q-value for the state-action pairs, and the network-wide
complexity is O(|I||S||A|) since we assume there are |I|
agents in the network.
Message complexity defines the number of messages being
exchanged among the agents in order to update a Q-value.
Using Algorithm 2, the step-wise complexity is ≤ |J | an
agent i exchanges shared information with its neighbors J
(Step 8) since we assume there are |J | neighboring agents;
the agent-wise complexity is ≤ |J |, since an agent i has |J |
neighboring agents to exchange messages, and the network-
wide complexity is ≤ |I||J | since we assume there are |I|
agents in the network.
Storage complexity defines the amount of memory required
to store local statistics and Q-values. Using Algorithm 1, the
step-wise complexity is 1 since an agent i stores its Q-value
for a state-action pair (Step 9); the agent-wise complexity is
≤ (|S||A|) in a Q-table, since an agent i updates its Q-value
for the state-action pairs, and the network-wide complexity
is O(|I||S||A|) since we assume there are |I| agents in the
network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This article presents a novel reinforcement learning (RL)-
based trust model for a cluster size adjustment scheme to
increase network scalability in a distributed cognitive radio
network (CRN). Given the CRNs’ intrinsic nature, which is dy-
namic in channel availability, it is necessary for the legitimate
secondary users (SUs) to efficiently utilize the available white
spaces in the network. However, such necessity has opened up
a security challenge as some SUs may intentionally waste the
white spaces causing the network to be unscalable.
The two main entities of interest are the attackers and
the clusterhead. The attackers launch two main types of
attack, namely non-single agent RL attack (non-SARL) (or
non-intelligence attack), which consists of deterministic and
random attacks, and RL attack (or intelligent attack), which
consists of SARL and multi-agent RL (MARL) attacks. The
simulation results have shown that the non-RL attack, namely
random attack yields the same attack effects as the determin-
istic (Iit = 1) attack while the RL attack, namely SARL attack
causes the most detrimental effects to the cluster size, followed
by the MARL attack and non-SARL attack (see Fig. 10 and
Fig. 13). As for the clusterhead, the proposed clusterhead rule-
based SARL approach (QV9eRL) has been shown to improve
cluster scalability compared to the non-SARL and traditional
(SARL) approaches by increasing the cluster size ratio in the
network up to 18%.
Further research can be pursued to investigate the following
open issues. Firstly, multi-clusters can be established in the
distributed network to facilitate token sharing amongst the
clusterheads so as to best utilize the available resources in
the network. For instance, when a clusterhead discovers that
its member nodes are mostly malicious, it can transfer its
available budget to its neighboring clusters, which may have
more trustworthy member nodes. Secondly, to address the
marginal improvement on the ability of the SARL clusterhead
to detect malicious SUs, specifically in Scenarios (b) and (d),
the SARL clusterheads in the multi-clusters scenario can adopt
a flexible mode of learning, whereby the clusterheads can
switch between SARL and MARL approaches under different
operating environments. For instance, when the operating
environment is considered stable (i.e., the probability of attack
is less than 0.6 and the cluster size ratio is greater than 0.5 as
shown in Figs. 9 and 10, respectively, a clusterhead chooses
the MARL approach). Thirdly, from the attacker’s perspective,
several models such as Strategically-Timed Attack, which is a
strategically-timed attack that selects a subset of time steps
to attack, and Enchanting Attack, which lures the Deep RL
clusterhead from its current state to a specified target state,
can be investigated [37]. Finally, since MARL attackers (i.e.,
attackers with greater capability) do not exhibit their effec-
tiveness of attack in a dynamic operating environment, further
work can be carried out to reduce the number of collaborative
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attackers when they launch such attack. Lesser number of
MARL attackers may increase the attack effectiveness since
lesser and possible inaccurate knowledge is being shared [35].
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